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Abstract
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in creating incentives for
firms to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy by disclosing pub-
licly self-regulatory corporate efforts. Their informational behavior is heterogeneous:
Some NGOs mostly disclose information on firms that do not behave responsibly
(e.g., Greenpeace). Others are specialized in revealing firms that are socially or envir-
onmentally responsible (e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council). We develop a model
describing the interactions between a NGO, a continuum of firms and a representat-
ive stakeholder to explain what drives the NGO communication choice and its impact
on the level of self-regulation.
We show that the NGO specializes in equilibrium: depending on the size of its
budget, it either chooses to cheer the leaders or to boo the laggards. We extend the
model to the case with multiple NGOs. We also introduce the possibility of NGO-
corporate partnerships and derive policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Firms frequently take socially and environmentally friendly actions not required by law,
thereby privately providing public goods, or voluntarily internalizing externalities. For
example, the oil company Total finances the rehabilitation of the Anggana mangrove
forest in the Mahakam Delta in Indonesia. The chemical and pharmaceutical company
Bayer develops programs to promote employees gender diversity. Komatsu1 seeks to
address employee mental health concerns. The Coca-Cola Company has implemented
a comprehensive corporate policy, including quantified objectives regarding packaging
recycling, water stewardship, energy conservation, etc. Albeit ill-defined, the concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a convenient umbrella term to designate such
activities.
As self-regulatory efforts are arguably costly, the reasons why corporations are willing
to self-regulate have been extensively explored in the economic literature. Many works
stress the fact that some stakeholders are willing to reward CSR leading firms or, altern-
atively, to punish laggards. Some consumers may accept to buy their products at a higher
price or boycott ’dirty’ corporations (Bagnoli andWatts, 2003; Arora and Gangopadhyay,
1995). Employees may work in a more productive way, or they may accept lower wages
in environmentally- or socially-responsible firms (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). Socially re-
sponsible investors can help leading firms to reduce the cost of capital (Heinkel and al.,
2001).
The problem is that self-regulation is a credence good whose benefit is impossible for
an individual consumer, employee or investor to ascertain. It provides the rationale for
the existence of specialized actors that have sufficient resources to observe self-regulatory
activities of individual firms and to convey this information to the stakeholders. Without
such a monitoring, stakeholders are not able to reward individual efforts or punish lazi-
ness, thereby reducing self-regulation in the first place. This paper focuses on NGOs.
Beside labeling organizations or rating agencies, they now play a key role in monitoring
and communicating over CSR corporate efforts (Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001).
The starting point of the paper is the observation that, in the real world, NGOs have
heterogeneous informational behaviors. Some NGOs are specialized in the transmission
of good news: they certify that a firm – or a product – is socially or environmentally re-
sponsible. An illustration is the Marine Stewardship Council certification which rewards
1A multinational corporation that manufactures construction, mining, and military equipment.
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sustainable fishing by certifying about 12 percent of the world catch intended to human
consumption. Other NGOs mostly send bad news: Greenpeace is the emblematic ex-
ample of an organization that fiercely conducts campaigns against firms that they do not
deem to behave responsibly. Lie in between neutral NGOs which send both and bad
news, as for example WWFwhich alternates between cooperative and offensive behavior
toward firms depending on their compliance with WWF demands. In the following, we
refer to the NGOs which cheer CSR leaders as good cops whereas bad cops are NGOs
which boo the laggards. Note that this heterogeneity may reflect selective monitoring -
the NGO focuses on the observation of positive activities - or selective disclosure - the
NGO chooses to communicate only some of its monitoring results.
In this paper we seek to understand when and why NGOs choose between sending
good news or bad news. Another objective of the paper is to study how differences in
NGO communication shape the firms’ incentives to self regulate.
To answer these questions, we build a simplemodel with asymmetric information that
describes the interaction between a continuum of firms that may individually decide to
self-regulate (a = 1) or not (a = 0), a stakeholder who is willing to pay for self-regulation
and a NGO that seeks to maximize the average level of self-regulation under a budget
constraint and that provides the stakeholder with imperfect information on a. We also
extend the analysis to a setting with multiple NGOs.
Information disclosure by the NGO is asymmetric. More specifically, the NGO ob-
serves action and conveys this information to the stakeholder with a probability g when
a = 1 (good news) and with a probability bwhen a = 0 (bad news). The parameters g and
b are endogenously selected by the NGO which can decide to be neutral (g = b), a good
cop (g > b) or a bad cop (g < b). We use the model to investigate how the NGO disclosure
probabilities (g, b) shape firms’ behavior and then to characterize the probabilities chosen
in equilibrium by the NGO.
We show that the NGO decides to specialize: If its budget is limited, it chooses to
be a good cop (g > 0 and b = 0). When more resources are available, it opts for being
a bad cop (b > 0 and g = 0). The intuition is that it is more effective to go against
the stakeholder expectations: A low budget limits disclosure probabilities, implying low
firms’ incentives to self-regulate. Being aware of this, the stakeholder holds pessimistic
beliefs on the expected level of self-regulation. By filtering good firms out, a good cop
improves the belief about firms whom she receives no news about.
We then extend the analysis by assuming multiple NGOs which non cooperatively
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select their technology. It gives birth to a coordination problem whereby NGO choices
are biased towards friendliness. We also study the potential role of a welfare-maximizing
regulator and we introduce the opportunity for firms to form partnerships with NGOs.
The economic literature on self-regulation and Corporate Social Responsibility has
already explored the role of NGOs and activists in triggering corporate socially- and
environmentally-responsible investments. For instance, "Good Cop/Bad Cop" is the title
of a recent book edited by Tom Lyon (2010) which contrasts the heterogeneity of NGO
strategies towards business. But none of the contributions in this book develops a the-
oretical analysis of what drives such strategies. There exist theoretical works which spe-
cifically deal with bad cops. For instance, Baron (2001) and Lyon and Maxwell (2011)
investigate the impact of NGOs which are able to penalize firms which do not make suf-
ficient environmental or social efforts. Others deal with good cops, and in particular with
the role of NGOs in product labeling (ecolabels, fair trade, etc.). For example, Bottega and
De Freitas (2009) compare two certifiers: a NGO and a for-profit organization. None of
these papers deal with the different types of NGO in a unified framework as we do in this
paper.
The paper is structured as follows. We present the base model with a single NGO in
the next section. We extend to the case with multiple NGOs and we address regulation
issues in the third section. In the fourth section, we analyze the role of corporate-NGO
partnership. We summarize the results and conclude in the last section.
2 The base model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a continuum of firms that may self-regulate or not. Each firmmakes a binary
decision: a = 1 if it self-regulates, a = 0 if it carries on with business-as-usual. Self-
regulation costs c, which is heterogeneous across firms and uniformly distributed over
[0; 1]. Assuming that c is positive is in line with the very nature of self-regulation: it con-
sists in improving social and environmental performance beyond the business-as-usual.
That is, once all actions at negative cost have been implemented. The assumption that
c  1 is irrelevant qualitatively. It simplifies the notations. Uniformity of distribution
ease interpretation as it allows obtaining closed-form expressions. It also leads to rule out
multiple equilibria which can arise in hostile informational environments (see Fleckinger
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et al., 2012).
We assume the existence of a stakeholder who has a (marginal) willingness to pay
w1  1 for self-regulation and w0  0 for business-as-usual2. But the stakeholder is not
able to observe a on her own and bases her desicion to reward or not the firms on the
information provided by the NGO. More specifically:
 In the case where a firm chooses a = 1, the NGO discloses the value of a with a
probability g. With a probability 1  g, no information is generated about the firm’s
action. The stakeholder believes the news (hard information). We rule out any po-
tential concerns about the NGO credibility.
 In the case where a = 0, the disclosure probability is b. With probability 1  b, she
receives no news.
If the stakeholder learns that a = 1, she transfers w1 to that firm. Hence, we assume
that the firm is able to fully extract the stakeholder’s surplus.3 Conversely, she punishes
the firm with a negative transfer w0 when she learns that a = 0. When she receives no
news about the action of a given firm, she forms a belief µ that the firm self-regulates and
transfers µw1 + (1  µ)w0 to the firm. The stakeholder is sophisticated in that she relies
on Bayes’ rule to form her belief.
The disclosure technology is thus fully described by the probabilities (g, b). These are
endogenously chosen by the NGO, which can decide to be neutral (g = b), a good cop
(g > b), or a bad cop (g < b). However, the NGO has limited resources which prevent
to obtain and/or convey perfect information about a. More specifically, we introduce the
assumption that g+ b  α.4
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The NGO selects the disclosure probabilities (g, b).
2. Each firm decides to self-regulate (a = 1) or not (a = 0).
3. The NGO discloses the value of a with probabilities g and b if a = 1 and b = 0,
respectively.
2At some point, we normalize w1   w0 to 1, which does not alter our results qualitatively
3We could assume that the firms could only extract a share, say α, of the surplus. This would not affect
qualitatively the results.
4As we will see below the linearity of this resource constraint simplifies the analysis by generating
simple corner solutions. But relaxing this assumption would not qualitatively alter the results.
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4. The stakeholder transfers w0, w1 or µw1 + (1   µ)w0 depending on the messages
received.
Note that, if information on a were perfect, all firms would self-regulate, which is
socially optimal as c  w1 for all c. Our analysis explore how information asymmetry
prevents from reaching this first best outcome. In this respect, the fact that the NGO has
limited resources is crucial. Without this hypothesis, the NGO would provide perfect
information (g = b = 1), inducing self-regulation by all firms.
We now proceed in two steps. First, we characterize firms’ response to a given mon-
itoring technology (g, b). Second we identify the technology selected by the NGO which
seeks to maximize CSR under the constraint g+ b = α.
2.2 Firm’s choice
Consider a firm of type c. Its expected payoff isΠ(a = 1) = gw1+(1  g) (µw1 + (1  µ)w0) 
c under self-regulation while its payoff is Π(a = 0) = bw0 + (1  b) (µw1 + (1  µ)w0)
otherwise. Hence, the firm self-regulates if:
c  (w1   w0)((g  (g  b)µ)
An almost immediate consequence of this incentive constraint is that the CSR equilibrium
is characterized by a cost threshold belowwhich firms self-regulate and above which they
do not. Let c denote that threshold and normalize w1 w0 = 1 to simplify notations. We
have
c = g  (g  b)µ (1)
The belief that is consistent in the Bayesian sense with this cutoff is then
µ = (1  g)c

(1  g)c + (1  b)(1  c) (2)
The two equations (1) and (2) defines the Bayesian equilibrium.
It will prove more convenient to adopt a standard fixed point representation of the
equilibrium to investigate equilibrium existence properties. Combining (1) and (2), the
cutoff equilibrium satisfies
c = Φ(c) where Φ(c)  g(1  b)  (g  b)c
(1  b)  (g  b)c (3)
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We establish properties of Φ that will be useful in the following:
Lemma 1 1) Φ(0) = g, Φ(1) = b. 2) Φ is increasing if g > b and decreasing if g  b. 3) Φ is
concave.
Proof. 1) Obvious. 2) Differentiation of Φ yields dΦdc (c) =   (g b)(1 g)(1 b)[1 b (g b)c]2 , which is
positive if g  b and negative otherwise. 3) We have d2Φdc2 (c) =
(g b)2(1 g)(1 b)
[(g b)c (1 b)]3 , which
have the same sign as that of (g   b)c   (1  b). This expression is obviously negative
when g   b  0. When g   b > 0, it is maximized in c = 1 and (g   b)c   (1  b) =
 (1  g) < 0 in this case.
Then we use these properties to draw the function Φ in Figure 1. In this graph, any
equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of Φwith the 45 degree line. When g > b (Fig
1a), there exists a unique equilibrium as Φ is decreasing, starts above the 45 degree line
(Φ(0) = g > 0) and ends up below (Φ(1) = b < 1).
1
1 c
b
Φ
g
1
1 c
b
Φ
g
c* c*
Figure 1: Good cop ( g > b) versus bad cop ( g < b) equilibria
In the case where g < b, Φ is increasing. If g > 0, we have Φ(0) = g > 0, meaning
that Φ starts above the 45 degree line in c = 0. It is the case depicted in Fig. 1b. Property
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1 and the intermediate value theorem ensures existence. The equilibrium is also unique:
as Φ crosses the 45 degree line from above in c, concavity of Φ ensures it will never cross
it for higher values of c.
Things are slightly more complicated when g = 0. To begin with, c = 0 is always an
equilibrium (Φ(0) = 0). If dΦ/dc(0)  1, which is equivalent to b  12 , this equilibrium
is unique for Φ is concave as argued before. When dΦ/dc(0) > 1, there will be a second
equilibrium as Φ is higher than c when deviating upward from zero.
We now summarize our findings.
Proposition 1 (Existence) There always exists a (subgame) equilibrium which is defined by the
condition (3). But the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. More precisely:
 When g > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium c which is strictly positive. c is defined by
(3).
 When g = 0 and b  12 , the unique equilibrium is c = 0.
 When g = 0 and b > 12 , there exists two equilibria. The first is c = 0 and the second is
strictly positive.
In the following, we rely on simulations to establish some of our results in order to
avoid cumbersome calculations. We thus need an explicit expression of c in the case
where it differs from zero.
Lemma 2 Equilibrium with a strictly positive amount of CSR is defined as follows:
 When g = b, we have c = b = g.
 When g 6= b :
c = 1
2 (g  b)

g  2b+ 1 
q
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b)

Proof. See in Appendix.
8
2.3 NGO choice
Our objective is now to characterize the disclosure probabilities (g, b) that will be selec-
ted by the NGO, given the firms’ response. Formally, the NGO solves
max
g,b
c(g, b) subject to g+ b = α (4)
where c is the equilibrium defined by Proposition 1.
The possibility that the NGO chooses g and b such that c = 0 is excluded since it
precisely seeks to maximize c5.We can thus concentrate on the equilibrium characterized
in Lemma 2.
We first run simulations to show that there is no interior maximum. The results are
displayed in Figure 2 which plots c as a function of g for different values of α. We can
see that either c increases with g when α is low or the curve is U-shaped with an interior
minimum.
g	=	αg	=	0
α =	0.5
α =	0.4
α =	0.3
α =	0.2
α =	0.1
c*
5This also applies to the zero equilibrium when it coexists with the positive equilibrium in the case
where g = 0 and b > 1/2: as soon as g deviates upward from zero with an infinitesimal amount, this
equilibrium disappears.
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g	=	αg	=	0
α =	1
α =	0.9
α =	0.8
α =	0.7
α =	0.6
α =	0.5
c*
Figure 2: c as a function of g for different value of α
Having ruled the existence of interior solutions out, we compare the two corner solu-
tions (g = α and g = 0) in Appendix. We obtain a new proposition.
Proposition 2 The NGO chooses to be a bad cop with g = 0 and b = α if α > 23 . Otherwise it
chooses to be a good cop (g = α and b = 0).
Proof. See in Appendix.
Let us now discuss the conditions α ? 23 . A high α means that the NGO produces a
lot of information about firms’ behavior. Incentives for firms to invest in self-regulation
are thus high, implying that the stakeholder holds an optimistic belief that one firm about
whom she does not receive any news is actually self-regulating. In this context, it is more
effective for the NGO to be hostile in order to deter firms from shirking on this optimistic
state of mind. It mitigates their incentives to free ride on the lack of information. And
conversely when the stakeholder is pessimistic about the level of self-regulatory efforts
(because α is low), it is more effective to motivate firms by increasing the probability g to
get the full reward when self-regulating rather than the probability b to get close nothing
because of the stakeholder’s low belief when exerting no effort. The general point here
is that the best strategy consists in going against the stakeholder’s a priori built upon the
environment characteristics captured by the parameter α6.
6One should not give too much importance to the fact that we only obtain corner solutions for it is due
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As the NGO maximizes the average level of self-regulation and as self-regulation im-
proves social welfare, note that:
Corollary 1 The NGO choice is socially optimal.
3 Multiple NGOs
In reality, firms are under the scrutiny of several NGOs. That is why we extend the base
model to account for the existence of n NGOs. Each has the same budget α(α < 1). Let gi
and bi denote the values of g and b selected by the NGO i (i = 1, ..n). Each NGO has the
budget constraint gi+ bi = α. The overall probability G that a firm with a = 1 is observed
by at least one NGO is thus
G(g1, ..gi, ..gn) = gi + (1  gi)

1  Π
j 6=i
(1  gj)

(5)
That is, either the firm is observed by the NGO i or it does not, but at least another NGO
j 6= i does so7. Similarly, the probability that a = 0 is disclosed is
B(b1, ..bi, ..bn) = bi + (1  bi)

1  Π
j 6=i
(1  bj)

. (6)
The level of self-regulation is still defined by Proposition 1 except that we replace g and b
by the aggregate probabilities G and B.
3.1 Best reply
The best reply of the NGO i to the n  1 other NGOs strategies is the couple (gi, bi)which
solves
max
gi,bi
c (G(g1, ..gi, ..gn), B(b1, ..bi, ..bn)) subject to gi + bi = α
to the linear budget constraint g+ b = α. Other functional forms would probably lead to interior solutions,
but this would not modify qualitatively the result that the NGO does not select g = b and the nature of the
influence of the environment characteristics.
7Π(1 
j 6=i
gj) is the probability that none of the n  1 other NGOS discloses a = 1. Hence, the probability
that at least one discloses it is 1 Π(1 
j 6=i
gj).
11
Note that:
∂G
∂gi
= Π
j 6=i
(1  gj) > 0,
∂B
∂bi
= Π
j 6=i
(1  bj) > 0.
These properties simplify the problem as raising gi or bi basically means raising G or B.
The aggregate probability G will be equal to G(g1, .., gj 1, 0, gj+1..gn) if the NGO selects
gi = 0 and to G(g1, .., gj 1, α, gj+1..gn) if gi = α. Hence, selecting gi amounts to select a
value of G in the interval Ai 

G(g1, .., gj 1, 0, gj+1..gn),G(g1, .., gj 1, α, gj+1..gn)

. Con-
sider then Figure 2. Ai is a segment of the curves that are depicted in this graph. In the
case where c is increasing over the whole interval Ai, the NGO i is better off by increas-
ing gi as much as possible. Hence, it chooses gi = α. In the case where it is decreasing,
gi = 0. In the case where the curve is U-shaped over Ai, the NGO’s best reply is either
gi = 0 or gi = α, depending on the precise location of Ai on the curve.
The common point to every case is that the best reply is a corner choice whatever the
others’ strategies. The last step of this analysis consists in identifying the precise condition
that defines the best of the two candidate corner solutions. We obtain the following:
Lemma 3 All NGOs have the same best reply function. If
α+

2  Π
j 6=i
(1  gj)  Π
j 6=i
(1  bj)

(1  α)
2  α >
Π
j 6=i
(1  bj)
Π
j 6=i
(1  gj) + Π
j 6=i
(1  bj) , (7)
the best reply is to be a bad cop (gi = 0 and bi = α). Otherwise, they prefer to be good cops (gi = α
and bi = 0).
Proof. See in Appendix.
3.2 Nash equilibrium
Having identified the best reply function of each NGO in Lemma 3, we now identify
the resulting Nash equilibrium. The intermediate cases where some NGOs would opt for
being a good cop and others for being a bad cop can be easily excluded. It would result in
an equilibrium value of G strictly higher than G(0, .., 0) and strictly lower than G(α, .., α).
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But, given the function c depicted in Figure 2, some NGO would then have an incentive
to deviate towards one of the corner values of G. We can thus concentrate the analysis on
the corner cases.
Consider first the equilibrium in which all NGOs choose to be bad cops: gi = 0,
bi = α. Plugging these values in (5) and (6), the resulting overall probabilities are G = 0
and B = 1  (1  α)n. Hence, the constraint (7) becomes
1 > 2(1  α)n + (1  α)2n 1
Taking Note that the left-hand side decreases with α. Furthermore, the inequality is sat-
isfied when α = 1 and not when α = 0. Hence, there exists a unique value of α 2 (0, 1),
denoted αlim, such that:
1  2(1  αlim)n + (1  αlim)2n 1 (8)
For all the values of α such that α > αlim, there exists a Nash equilibrium where all the
NGOs choose to be a bad cop.
Turning next the equilibriumwhere all NGOs choose to be good cops ( gi = α, bi = 0),
the best reply condition (7) is
1  (1  α)n < (1  α) + 1
(1  α)n 1 + 1
It is easy to see that this condition is always satisfied as the left-hand side is higher than 1
whereas the right-hand side is less than 1. We can thus conclude.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium depends on whether the NGOs’ budget is higher or lower than a
threshold αlim defined by (8).
 If α < αlim, there exists only one Nash equilibrium where all NGOs choose to be good cops.
 If α  αlim, there exists two equilibria. In the first one, all NGOs are good cops. In the
second, all are bad cops.
This proposition highlights a coordination problem that arises when there are a lot of
NGOs (αlim decreases with the number of NGOs) with a confortable budget. The equilib-
rium is thus not always socially efficient contrary to the single-NGO case (see Corollary
1). This creates the opportunity for a welfare-improving public intervention. The next
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proposition presents a simple decision rule to help NGOs to select the Pareto dominant
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 1. If α < αlim, public intervention is not necessary
2. If αlim  α  1  3  1n , the regulator should help the NGOs to select the good cop equilib-
rium.
3. If α > 1  3  1n , it should help to select the bad cop equilibrium.
Proof. See in Appendix.
Subsidizing NGOs is another way of improving social welfare. It amounts to increas-
ing the budget α available to eachNGO, which in turn leads to higher disclosure probabil-
ities G or B. Ignoring the opportunity cost of such subsidies, welfare obviously improves
as higher probabilities raise the level of self-regulation:
Proposition 5 Subsidizing NGOs improves social welfare as it raises disclosure probabilities and
thus the level of self-regulation ( dc

dG > 0,
dc
dB > 0).
Proof. See in Appendix.
4 Corporate-NGO partnership
In reality, firms have the opportunity to develop partnerships with NGOs. They trans-
fer resources to some organizations, which are used to finance monitoring and reporting
activities, resulting in better information on firms’ behavior. In this section, we intro-
duce in our setting the possibility for firms to enter partnerships and we examine how it
influences the results obtained so far.
A NGO may commit to publicize specifically the partnering firm’s social or environ-
mental performance. For instance, the NGO grants a product label. In other cases, the
firm contributes with a donation, enabling the NGO to increase its overall activities, but
without targeting specifically its donors. In the following, we refer to the second scenario
as a collective partnership as the increase in disclosure probabilities concerns all firms
whereas the first is referred to as an individual partnership. We successively analyze
these two forms.
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4.1 Collective partnership
Under a collective partnership, a firm’s contribution leads to an increase in the overall
probabilities G or B. We pose the problem as follows. In the status quo, n NGOs with
budget α have selected their communication strategy. We assume the equilibrium is so-
cially efficient (because they were able to coordinate, eventually with a regulator’s sup-
port). Hence if α < 1   3  1n , they are all good cops. Otherwise, they are all bad cops.
We then study whether an individual firm’s equilibrium profit increases with disclosure
probabilities G or B. To begin with, we establish a Lemma describing the marginal effect
of G and B on equilibrium profits.
Lemma 4 We have:
1. dpi(a=1)dB > 0 and
dpi(a=1)
dG > 0
2. dpi(a=0)dB > 0 and
dpi(a=0)
dG > 0 if α < 1  3 
1
n and  0 otherwise.
Proof. See in Appendix.
We can immediately derive that:
Proposition 6 If the status quo is the good cop equilibrium (α < 1  3  1n ), all firms are willing
to enter collective partnerships. If it is the bad cop equilibrium (α  1  3  1n ), the self-regulating
firms are the only potential contributors.
This result is very intuitive: firms which do not self-regulate do not contract with
bad cops. Note however that the bad cop equilibrium emerges only when the average
level of CSR is high (because α  2/3), meaning that the share of firms which does not
self-regulate is low in relative terms. Note also that this analysis only looks at firms’ pref-
erences, ruling out free riding issues stemming from the fact that the benefit of collective
partnership is a public good. Hence, the proposition only gives a necessary condition for
the existence of collective partnerships.
4.2 Individual partnership
We model individual partnership as follows: Each firm has the option to contract with
a NGO which commits to disclose the firm’s action with a probability equal to one8 in
8Note that the distinction between a good cop and a bad cop is not relevant anymore when the NGO is
engaged in a partnership. If the NGO is initially a good cop which increase its probability to g = 1. This
implies that receiving no news means a = 0 for the stakeholder (as if b = 1). Conversely, if the NGO is a
bad cop commiting to b = 1, receiving no news means a = 1 (as if g = 1).
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exchange of a transfer t. Let s denote a binary variable equal to one if the firm enters
a partnership and 0 it it does not. We assume the stakeholder observes s. To simplify
notations, we also assume w0 = 0 and w1 = 1 (hence, we still have w1   w0 = 1).
In this new version of the game, a firm’s strategy is the pair (a, s) and its payoff is
Π(a, s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
G+ (1  G)µ1   c if a = 1, s = 0
1  c  t if a = 1, s = 1
(1  B)µ2 if a = 0, s = 0
 t if a = 0, s = 1
Note that beliefs can be different when the strategy pair is (a = 1, s = 0) and (a = 0, s =
0). We can immediately rule out the strategy (a = 0, s = 1) because it is strictly dominated
by (a = 0, s = 0) : it is irrational to costly reveal a = 0.
Consider now a firm that self-regulates (a = 1). The firm has an incentive to contract
with a NGO if G+(1 G)µ1  c < 1  c  t. Hence, if t < (1 G)(1  µ1). This condition
does not depend on c; it implies that either all self-regulating firms decide to signal their
action or none of them does so. It simplifies the stakeholder’s Bayesian updating: as soon
as she observes one partnership, she knows that entering a partnership is profitable for all
firms with a = 1. Reciprocally, all firms without partnership have thus chosen a = 0. In
fact, as soon as there is at least one partnership, the belief µ2 is equal to 0. In this context,
each firm decides to self-regulate if its payoff with self-regulation and partnership, 1 
c   t is positive (the payoff without self-regulation and without partnership is equal to
zero). We get the classical unravelling separating equilibrium in which firms choose (a =
1, s = 1) if c  1  t and (a = 0, s = 0), otherwise.
Let us now come back to the case where self-regulating firms do not signal their action
(t  (1 G)(1  µ1)). As firms with a = 0 does not contract with a NGO, the stakeholder
does not observe any partnership. It is the standard case without partnership analyzed
in the previous sections: firms choose to self-regulate if c < c with c defined by (1) and
µ1 = µ
 defined by (2). We now summarize these results.
Lemma 5 When firms have the option to contract with a NGO such that its disclosure probability
becomes one at cost t, two equilibria are possible:
1. If t  (1  G)(1  µ), none of the firms contract with a NGO and firms with type c < c
choose to self-regulate with c defined by (1).
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2. If t < (1  G)(1  µ), the firm of type c  1  t self-regulates and contract with a NGO.
The others do nothing.
In the second case, we get a separating equilibrium which fundamentally differs from
the equilibrium obtained in the base model. It is easy to show that:
Proposition 7 The average level of self-regulation is higher when firms have the possibility to
enter individual partnerships.
Proof. Remember that NGOs choose to be either all good cops (g = α, b = 0) or all bad
cops (g = 0, b = α) in the base model. If they all choose to be good cops, we have (from 1)
that c = α(1 µ). Besides, we know that t < (1  α)(1 µ), thus 1  t > α  α(1 µ).
If they all choose to be good cops we have (from 1) that c = αµ. Besides, we know
that t < (1  µ) which implies 1  t > µ > c.
The proposition is very intuitive as partnerships basically increase the amount of in-
formation on self regulation. When are then individual partnerships more likely to oc-
cur? Answering the question requires to interpret the threshold (1  G)(1  µ). In the
bad cops equilibrium (α < 1  3  1n ), the threshold simplifies to 1  µ. When establishing
Lemma 5, we have seen that µ was increasing with B. Hence, the higher the resources
available to the NGOs, the lower this threshold, and thus the less likely individual part-
nerships. In the good cops equilibrium, we have seen that µ was also increasing with G.
Hence, the threshold is lower and the partnership less likely. Both results go in the same
direction:
Corollary 2 The higher NGOs budget, the less likely individual partnerships.
5 Conclusion
The main objective of the paper is to characterize what drives NGOs’ communication
strategy, contrasting good cops   NGOs which disclose information about firms which
self-regulate   and bad cops  NGOs which disclose information on firms which do not.
To answer these questions, we consider a model featuring a continuum of firms which
can self-regulate or not, a stakeholder who is willing to reward self-regulation but who is
not able to observe the firms’ behavior and non governmental organizations (NGOs) that
induce self-regulation by imperfectly disclosing on firms’ level of self-regulation.
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We show that the NGO decides to specialize: if its budget is low, it chooses to be a
good cop. When the budget is larger, it opts for being a bad cop. The general point here
is that the best information disclosure strategy consists in going against the stakeholder’s
a priori built upon the environment characteristics: a high budget mean that the NGO
produces much information about firms’ behavior. Incentives for firms to invest in CSR
are thus high, implying that the stakeholder holds an optimistic belief that one firm about
whom she does not receive any news is actually self-regulating. In this context, it is more
effective for the NGO to be hostile as this mitigates their incentives to free ride on the
lack of information. And conversely when the stakeholder is pessimistic about the level
of self-regulation (because NGOs’ budget is limited), it is more effective to motivate firms
by increasing the probability g to get the full reward when investing in self-regulation.
We develop several extensions of the model. First, we assume multiple NGOs which
non cooperatively select their technology. A coordination problem arises for the two pos-
sible equilibria -NGOs being all bad cops and NGOs being all good cops- sometimes
coexist. We also introduce the option for firms to cooperate with NGOs. More specific-
ally, we distinguish individual partnership, whereby the NGO specifically publicizes the
partnering firm’s behavior, and collective partnership whereby industry support leads to
an increase of the aggregate disclosure probability.
Although the prime focus of the analysis is positive, it is possible to derive a gen-
eral policy lesson. When the amount of resources available to NGOs is limited and/or
the number of NGOs is low, everything is going smoothly and the role of a welfare-
maximizing regulator is limited: There exists a single equilibrium which is socially op-
timal. As all NGOs are good cops, firms are willing to engage in collective or individual
partnerships in order to increase the quantity of information, which in turn increases self-
regulation and thus social welfare. Things get more complicated when the quantity of
information is such that the social outcome is the bad cop equilibrium. In this case, the
coordination problem can lead to the survival of the good cop equilibrium. It is reinforced
by the fact that firms which do not self-regulate do not form partnerships anymore and
self-regulating firms are less prone to enter in partnership for the benefits get smaller. To
sum up, a public intervention promoting bad cops becomes increasingly useful.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
To begin, we plug g = b in (3) to obtain c in the case where g = b. Then, solving (3) for c
yields two roots:
c1 =
1
2 (g  b)

g  2b+ 1+
q
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b)

c2 =
1
2 (g  b)

g  2b+ 1 
q
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b)

When g  b > 0, c1 > 1 as this inequality is equivalent to
q
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b) >
  (1  g) , which is obviously satisfied.
When g   b < 0,
q
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b)  jg  2b+ 1j . Then we have
two subcases: If g  2b+ 1  0, jg  2b+ 1j = g  2b+ 1, the term in brackets is obvi-
ously positive, implying c1 < 0. If g  2b+ 1 < 0, jg  2b+ 1j =   (g  2b+ 1) . Henceq
(g  2b+ 1)2   4g (1  b) (g  b)    (g  2b+ 1). The term in brackets is thus posit-
ive, meaning that c1  0.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For ease of presentation, we introduce the following notations: cg  c(α, 0) and Φg 
Φ(c) when g = α and b = 0. Hence Φg =
α(1 c)
1 αc . Similarly, c

b is the stable equilibrium
c(0, α) and Φb  Φ(c) = αc1 α(1 c) . Furthermore, let c denote the value of c where
Φg = Φb . Straightforward calculations show that Φg(c) = Φb(c) = α2 α and c
 = 12 .
Then we consider two cases: Φg(c) = Φb(c) > c - which is equivalent to α > 2/3 - and
Φg(c) = Φb(c)  c.
Case 1: α > 2/3 From the intermediate value theorem (IVT) follows directly cg > c
: Φg(c) and Φg(1) = 0 are above and below the 45 degree line, respectively. The same
theorem also implies cb > c as Φb is above the 45 degree line in c and ends up below in
c = 1 (Φb(1) = α < 1).
Since Φg is decreasing and Φb is increasing (Property 2 in Lemma 1), we have the
general property thatΦg(c) < Φb(c0) for any c, c0 > c . It is thus satisfied in the particular
cases where c = cg and c0 = cb . It implies cg < cb as cg = Φg(cg) and cb = Φb(cb).
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Case 2: α  2/3 The IVT implies that cg  c . We also have cb  c because (i) Φb is
now below the 45 degree line in c , (ii) it ends up below in c = 0 (Φb(0) = α) and (iii)
Φb is concave (see footnote X). These three properties prevent Φb to intersect with the 45
degree line beyond c. ThenΦg(c)  Φb(c0) for any c, c0  c, cg  c and cb  c implies
cg > cb in this case.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
For ease of presentation, we introduce the following notations :
g i =

1  Π
j 6=i
(1  gj)

and b i =

1  Π
j 6=i
(1  bj)

cbi  c(g i, b i + α(1  b i))
cgi  c(g i + α(1  g i), b i)
Φgi(c)  Φ(c) with gi = α and bi = 0
Φbi(c)  Φ(c) with gi = 0 and bi = α
c = 1  b i
2  (b i + g i) such that Φgi(c) = Φbi(c)
Φgi(c
) = α+ (b i + g i) (1  α)
2  α
Then we follow closely the proof of Proposition 2. We know that
Φbi(0) < Φgi(0) and Φbi(1) > Φgi(1), for any gi, g i, bi, b i.
It follows that Φbi < Φgi if c < c
 and Φbi  Φgi if c  c. Nowwe consider two subcases:
 IfΦgi(c) = Φbi(c) > c, we necessarily have cbi > c and cgi > c from the IVT.We
also know that Φbi > Φgi if c > c
 and Φbi(1) > Φgi(1). Hence, Φgi will necessarily
the 45 degree line before Φbi when departing upward from c
. Hence cbi > c

gi .
 If Φgi(c) = Φbi(c) < c, we symmetrically have cbi < c and cgi > c and Φbi <
Φgi if c < c
 and Φbi(0) < Φgi(0). Hence c

gi > c

bi
.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We start characterizing the socially optimal benchmark. In the good cop equilibrium, we
have G = 1  (1  α)n and B = 0, whereas G = 0 and B = 1  (1  α)n if all NGOs are
bad cops. For ease of presentation, let P denote 1  (1  α)n. We thus need to compare
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c(0, P) with c(P, 0). It is exactly the comparison we have made in Proposition 2, which
establishes that c(P, 0) > c(0, P) if P < 2/3. It is equivalent to α  1  3  1n Then we
show that αlim  1  3  1n , which is equivalent to 3  1n < 1  αlim. Hence 2(1  αlim)n +
(1  αlim)2n 1 > 2/3+ 3
 1
n 2

. The lef-hand side is less than 1: it decreases with n and it
is equal to 1 when n = 1. This completes the proof as 2(1  αlim)n+ (1  αlim)2n 1 = 1 by
definition.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Differentiating the equilibrium condition c = Φ(c) and rearranging, we obtain:
dc
dG
=
∂Φ
∂G
1  dΦdc
and
dc
dB
=
∂Φ
dB
1  dΦdc
The stability condition is 1 
 dΦdc (c) > 0 which implies that 1  dΦdc > 0. (It is true when dΦdc (c) =   dΦdc (c) and  dΦdc (c) = dΦdc (c)). Hence we just need to look at the signs of
∂Φ
dG and
∂Φ
dB , which are both positive as
∂Φ
∂G
=
(1  B)2 (1  c)
(B  1+ c (G  B))2 and
∂Φ
∂B
=
c (1G)2
(Bc  B  cG+ 1)2 .
6.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Impact of G
We have
dpi(a = 1)
dG
= 1  µ + (1  G)dµ

dG
(9)
dpi(a = 0)
dG
= (1  B)dµ

dG
(10)
Rearranging (1) leads to µ = G cG B . Hence
dµ
dG =
1
G B

1  µ   dcdG

. We have dc

dG =
∂Φ
∂G

1  dΦdc
 1
with ∂Φ∂G =
(1 B)2(1 c)
1 B (G B)c . Combining µ
 = G cG B with (3) yields 1  µ =
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(1 B)(1 c)
1 B (G B)c . Plugging this expression in
∂Φ
∂G leads to
∂Φ
∂G =
(1 B)(1 µ)
1 B c(G B) . Hence
dµ
dG
=
(1  µ)
(G  B)

1  dΦdc
 1  dΦ
dc
  (1  B)
(1  B  c (G  B))

(11)
Then, we have Φ(c) = G(1 B) (G B)c
(1 B) (G B)c . Inverting this function yields c =
(1 B)(G Φ)
(G B)(1 Φ) . As
c = Φ in equilibrium, we have
c = (1  B)(G  c
)
(G  B)(1  c) . (12)
Rearranging this equation, we get 1  B  (G  B)c = (1  B)(1  G)/(1  c). Substi-
tuting 1  B  (G  B)cand dΦdc =   (G B)(1 c
)2
(1 B)(1 G) in (11) and rearranging, we obtain
dµ
dG
=
(1  µ)
(G  B)

1  dΦdc
  (G  B)(1  c)2   (G  c) (1  B)
(1  B)(1  G)

.
Rearranging (12) leads to (1  B)(G  c) = c(G  B)(1  c). Hence
dµ
dG
=
(1  c) (1  µ)
1  dΦdc

(1  B)(1  G)
(1  2c) . (13)
Plugging (13) in (9), we obtain
dpi(a = 1)/dG =
(1  µ)
1  dΦdc

(1  G) (G  B)

(1  G) (c   B) + (1  c)2 (G  B)

which is always positive: If G > B, c   B < 0, meaning the last term in bracket and the
first are both negative. If G < B, they are both positive.
Turning next to the firms which do not self-regulate, we have:
dpi(a = 0)
dG
= (1  B)dµ

dG
which is positive if and only if c < 1/2. If we now substitute
c = 1
2 (G  B)

G  2B+ 1 
q
(G  2B+ 1)2   4G (1  B) (G  B)

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in this inequality, calculations show that c < 1/2 is equivalent G < 2/3 if B = 0 and
B < 2/3 if G = 0. As B = 1   (1   α)n 1 when G = 0, B < 2/3 is equivalent to
α < 1  131/n .
Impact of B
We have
dpi(a = 1)
dB
= (1  G)dµ

dB
(14)
dpi(a = 0)
dB
=  µ + (1  B)dµ

dB
(15)
dµ
dB
=
1
G  B

µ   dc

dB

(16)
We have dc

dB =
∂Φ
∂B

1  dΦdc
 1
with ∂Φ∂B =
c(1 G)2
(bc B cg+1)2 . Combining µ
 = G cG B with (3)
yields µ = c
(1 G)
1 B (G B)c . Hence
∂Φ
∂B =
(1 G)µ
1 B (G B)c . It follows that
dµ
dB
=
µ
(G  B)

1  dΦdc
 1  dΦ
dc
  (1  G)
1  B  (G  B)c

.
As 1  B  (G  B)c = (1  B)(1  G)/(1  c) and dΦdc =   (G B)(1 c
)2
(1 B)(1 G) , we have
dµ
dB
=
µ
 
(c   B) (1  G) + (G  B)(1  c)2
(G  B) (1  B)(1  G)

1  dΦdc
 . (17)
which is always positive as G > B implies c  B > 0 and conversely. Therefore dpi(a=1)dB >
0.
Substituting (17) in (15) and rearranging, we obtain:
dpi(a = 0)
dB
=
µ(1  c)
1  dΦdc

(1  B)
(1  2c) .
which is positive only if c < 1/2 and thus α < 1  131/n .
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